Elements for an Ethnography of Fixed Elections

Cameroon’s Presidential Elections of 2011, 2018 and the Twin Elections of February 2020

Introduction

In the early hours of October 19, 2011, a sinister drama was unravelling at Cameroon’s Supreme Court in Yaoundé. At issue was a searing dispute between the opposition and Cameroon’s ruling party concerning the presidential election that had taken place ten days earlier. Cameroon’s leading opposition party at the time, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) led by John Fru Ndi had filed seven petitions that called for the annulment of the presidential elections – citing numerous irregularities and outright tampering with the votes. Unconvinced, the Supreme Court dismissed all the SDF’s petitions, paving the way for Paul Biya’s landslide victory.

“My lord, I have since 9:30, watched with dismay how justice and democracy are being crucified. I have watched you drive a sharp knife into the heart of justice,” John Fru Ndi stated, his fiery eyes fixed on Alexis Dipanda Mouelle, President of the Supreme Court. The latter had dealt Fru Ndi a terrible blow in October 1992 when he admitted widespread irregularities but confessed that his “hands were tied”.[1]

Thus, began a long series of dubious losses for John Fru Ndi, who after being declared the loser of the 1992 presidential election[2], was further subject to house arrest for several weeks. He later contested and lost the 1997, 2004, 2011 presidential elections and in 2018, his party suffered its heaviest defeat since its founding 30 years ago.

A close examination of Cameroon’s presidential elections since 1992 reveals a remarkable pattern – the plundering of state resources and use of its institutions to procure votes for the incumbent, Paul Biya; consistent irregularities with the voters’ record and finally, legitimizing the elections by use of diplomatic channels and/or questionable election monitors as well employing state violence to win the population’s acquiescence. These patterns are by no means exhaustive. However, for the sake of brevity, I will elaborate on the above points through a close examination of the presidential elections of 2011 and 2018 and conclude with the twin elections of the February 2020. My intention in this brief writeup is to inspire interest in detailed ethnographic studies on electioneering in Cameroon and beyond. The implications for such studies, both theoretical and practical are enormous.

Sardines for Votes

In 2011, 78-year-old Paul Biya extended his 29-year rule for another 7-year term when he was declared winner by 77.9% against John Fru Ndi (10.12%) and Garga Haman Adji (3.21%). As in previous years, the election results were declared under heavy deployment of armed security forces throughout the capital and in major cities across the country. In 2018, not only were security forces deployed in Douala and Yaoundé, but leading opposition figures were also placed under house arrest. Both campaigns in 2011 and 2018 were conducted in very tense atmospheres and particularly so in 2018 due to the ongoing military campaign against Anglophone separatist fighters in the country’s North West and South West regions. Journalists were also harassed (e.g. Reuters’ Josiane Kouagheu was arrested while covering a protest event in Douala). The NetBlocks Internet Shutdown Observatory also reported that social media platforms were slowed down by internet service providers.

A review of voter turnout for presidential elections since 2004 reveals a steady decline in voter participation; 79.52%, 68.28% and 53.85% for 2004, 2011 and 2018[3] respectively. The Crisis Group estimates that voter turnout for the 2018 presidential election in the Francophone regions was 55% and only about 5% in the conflict-ridden Anglophone regions. These numbers clearly demonstrate that most Cameroonians continue to lose faith in the electoral process and most increasingly doubt their ability to change the course of the country through the ballot.

Figure 1: Voter turnout in Cameroon’s elections 2004-2018

Electioneering in Cameroon often brings the government machinery to a halt in part because government employees, especially ministers and leading civil servants temporarily vacate their offices in order to campaign for Biya, typically at the expense of the state. Biya himself rarely campaigns for elections and his appearances have steadily declined over the years, leaving the bulk of the job to his associates. Biya’s Cameroon Peoples’ Democratic Movement (CPDM) often enjoys disproportionate access to national audio-visual platforms, especially the state-controlled Cameroon Radio Television (CRTV), while independent media are typically threatened with censor and shut downs. Not only are the airwaves monopolised, but also the runways. During the 2011 campaigns for example, John Fru Ndi accused airport authorities for preventing him from taking off at the Nsimalen International Airport for an entire day because the airport was being prepared for Biya’s return from a campaign trip in the northern city of Maroua. In 2018, social media were awash with images and videos of CPDM operatives inserting cash in ballot envelopes, distributing loafs of bread and tins of sardines at rallies and sharing party paraphernalia.

Sardines and bread offered by the CPDM in exchange for the youth vote

Where the Dead Vote

In its appeal to the Supreme Court for the annulment of the 2011 presidential elections, the SDF along with other opposition parties alleged that the voter’s register had not been updated in years – permitting the ruling CPDM to manipulate the votes in their favour. Proof of this allegation was substantiated with evidence that although Andze Tsoungui Gilbert (a former deputy prime minister) had died four years earlier (2007), his name still appeared on the voter’s roll for the presidential election of 2011.

The SDF’s submissions, although rejected by the Supreme Court, were validated by the chair of the quasi-independent electoral body, ELECAM, Samuel Azu’u Fonkam who admitted to multiple irregularities including the fact that many individuals had more than one voter’s card and that many deceased persons’ names appeared on the voter’s roll:

“We don’t have a civil status registry on which we can rely to have information about the dead. Cameroonians don’t have the habit of declaring the dead and not everybody even declares births.” ELECAM chair, Fonkam, October 25, 2011.

Thus, Biya’s government has maintained a convenient but fraudulent system that permits them to inflate the ballot with multiple votes including those of high-profile persons such as Tsoungui’s. The SDF’s proposal for a biometric registration/electoral process has been consistently rejected by the Biya government, thus leaving ELECAM unable to organise any election with the slightest credibility.

The same problems that plagued the 2011 elections repeated themselves in 2018 when Maurice Kamto’s party called for a partial cancellation whilst the SDF’s presidential candidate, Joshua Osih asked for the entire elections to be annulled and for the organisation of a re-run. A total of 18 petitions were submitted to the Constitutional Council for adjudication but these were all rejected.

Biya’s Foreign Friends

Despite the ELECAM chair’s own admission that the presidential elections of 2011 were fraught with many irregularities, the French foreign minister, Alain Juppe stated forcefully that the elections “took place in acceptable conditions”. Juppe’s statement contradicted those of many other bodies including the US ambassador to Cameroon, Robert Jackson, who reported that the entire election was marred by irregularities at every level. Unmoved by the widespread condemnation but with France as a steady ally, Biya has held on to power and even doubled-down on manufacturing the legitimacy of the 2018 elections. A day after the October 7 election in 2018, CRTV reported on a press conference that featured six international election monitors, supposedly from Transparency International, who certified the polls as “extremely good”. In fact, CRTV reported that the election monitors represented the famous anti-corruption organisation, Transparency International, as evidenced by the onscreen graphics linked to each participant’s name as well as the banner in the hotel where the press conference was organized. However, Transparency International later released a statement stating emphatically that it had not sent election observers to Cameroon: “A recent television report featuring individuals described as working for Transparency International is false and untrue”[4] the report asserted.

Although the African Union deployed 33 monitors for the presidential elections, bodies such as the European Union, the Commonwealth and the Carter Center were all absent – the latter three have frequently deployed election monitors to most African countries.

The Twin Elections of February 2020

On 9 February, 2020, Cameroon organized both Municipal and Legislative elections – following their postponement by executive order in July 2019[5]. Although the elections were boycotted by Maurice Kamto’s MRC and the SDF in the North West and South West regions, Cameroon’s territorial minister, Paul Atanga Nji declared the polls a resounding success. In the Anglophone regions where separatist fighters have been holding their ground against increased deployment of Cameroon forces, only a handful of people participated in the elections, predictably under heavy military protection. The Ambazonia Military Forces High Command had declared a lockdown between February 7 and 12 – provoking many to flee their homes into the bushes. Prior to the elections, the Cameroon military had undertaken many punitive campaigns throughout the Anglophone territories with scores of civilians killed[6]. In Bali, North West region for example, over a hundred homes were burnt by the military, at least two individuals with intellectual disabilities shot at close range and many others killed and thrown into the burning homes.

Some estimates put forth thus far suggest only about 43% of Cameroon’s eligible voting population participated in the election. The above estimate is ambitious given the turmoil that prevails in the country and that the major opposition parties didn’t field candidates. The same problems that plagued past elections repeated themselves – and predictably were worsened by the ongoing conflict in the Anglophone zones. In Bamenda for example, the military arrested residents indiscriminately, seized their National Identification Cards and requested them to reclaim their cards at designated polling stations on February 9. Deployed military men were reported to be seen in civilian clothing at campaign sites, ready to vote for the only party on the ballot, the CPDM.

Electioneering as a field for Ethnographic Research

The above narrative underscores the claim that the electoral process in Cameroon should not be equated with democratisation. Electioneering in Cameroon since 1992 for the most part has been associated with massive redistribution of state resources, especially amongst those ready to support dictator Paul Biya’s prolonged stay in office. It may be accurately suggested that electioneering in Cameroon has been characterized by a mixture of entrepreneurial ventures, the deployment of state violence and the perfection of manipulative measures to secure international legitimacy for what is indeed a police state. Elections in the current dispensation, regrettably, do not hold the promise for any meaningful regime change in Cameroon.

As a potential site for ethnographic research, a study of the electoral process in Cameroon will illuminate issues related to ethnicity, gender, urbanization, the occult and the mechanics of fraud – and indeed more than can be anticipated. Such a venture will also provide tremendous scope for comparisons with other African countries especially those run by autocrats – hence, establishing parallels and differences in the business of what I’d called “fixed elections”.

[1] Yerima Kini Nsom, Biya has Murdered Justice Through Supreme Court, The Post Newspaper, Oct 24, 2011

[2] This was the first multiparty presidential election to be held following the demise of the one-party state in 1990.

[3] Election Guide – Republic of Cameroon; http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/38/

[4] See International Election Observers in Cameroon are not Affiliated with Transparency Internationalhttps://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/election_observers_in_cameroon_are_not_affiliated_with_TI

[5] See: Legislative, Municipal Elections 2020: Political Parties Back to Remobilisation https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/article.html/26853/fr.html/legislative-municipal-elections-2020-political-parties-back

[6] See Cameroon: Election Violence in Anglophone Regions

https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/12/cameroon-election-violence-anglophone-regions

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